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摘要 
 
本文通过利用美国股票市场 2012-2014年的公司股票收益率，研究了公司
破产风险和公司盈余管理之间的关系，实证结果表明公司破产风险和盈余管理
之间存在着统计显著的负向关系，即那些具有低破产风险的公司（等价于那些
具有更低财务压力的公司）相比于高破产风险的公司更加倾向于盈余管理，再
次基础上本文更进一步探讨了传统上广泛使用的 Altman‘s Z-score方法是否可作
为公司破产风险的合理代理，本文的实证发现传统 Z-score方法并不成立。 
 
关键词：破产风险；盈余管理；Altman‘s Z-score 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between bankruptcy risk and earnings 
management by conducting an empirical study on the U.S. stock market. Data from 
year 2012-2014 is employed. The result shows that bankruptcy risk and earnings 
management are negatively related. That is, firms with low risk of bankruptcy (i.e. 
low financial distress) tend to engage in higher earnings management. In addition, 
using this empirical study on bankruptcy risk and earnings management, I further 
investigate whether ―Altman‘s Z-score‖ model, a widely-used model for bankruptcy 
evaluation, is still appropriate as a bankruptcy proxy. The result from this empirical 
study shows that the conventional model does not hold.  
 
Key words: bankruptcy risk; earnings management; Altman‘s Z-score 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Financial statements are purposely conducted to report firm‘s financial 
information, such as financial performance, financial position, and cash flows. 
Therefore, financial statements are useful tools to various types of users when they 
make economic decisions.
1
  However, if financial statements are not properly reported 
and contain falsified financial figures which do not reflect underlying economic 
financial position or performance of the entity, financial statements users (e.g. 
investors, creditors) may make wrong economic decisions. Hence, this could 
eventually affect the economy as a whole. According to ―PwC Global Economic 
Crime Survey 2014‖, it is reported that economic crime, such as fraud, corruption, or 
accounting fraud, continues to be a major issue for organizations of all sizes across all 
globe and in every sector. Accounting fraud is reported at 22 per cent of all the most 
commonly reported types of economic crime. According to ―2012 Global Fraud Study‖ 
by Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the portion of financial 
statements fraud was conducted approximately 8 per cent of the cases they 
investigated. Although the number of cases is slightly small, its impact was very high. 
The organization discovered that financial statement fraud has a highest median loss 
of  $1 million. 
Over the past decades, studies related to earnings management have received 
increasing attention. Several world accounting scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom, 
and Xerox, have emphasized the significance of the quality of financial reports in 
response to incentives associated with a specific event, one of those being the firm‘s 
financial health (DeAnglo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994; Rosner, 2003; Charitou, 
Lambertides & Trigeorgis, 2011; Agrawal & Chatterjee, 2015).  
As shown by existing studies, there are many reasons why the management 
might find earnings management desirable. For instance, Roychowdhury (2006) finds 
that earnings manipulation is used to conceal negative earnings, Matsumoto (2002) 
provides results that firms resort to earnings manipulation to avoid negative earnings 
surprises, Sweeney (1993) documents that firms conduct earnings management to 
reduce the risk of breaching debt contracts. Some scholars find evidence supporting 
                                                          
1
 "The Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements". International 
Accounting Standards Board. Accessed 28 January 2016. 
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that distressed firms use income-increasing techniques to hide their financial problems 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Rosner, 2003; Beneish, Press, & Vargus, 2011). 
Nevertheless, some discover that firms with financial difficulties employ downwards 
earnings management during the year surrounding contractual renegotiations so that 
they could achieve better negotiations (e.g. with banks or labor unions) or government 
assistance (DeAngelo et. al 1994; Saleh & Ahmed, 2012).  
This paper considers the impact of bankruptcy risk on earnings management. 
The purpose of this thesis is to measure the effect of bankruptcy risk on earnings 
management. On the other hand, many studies apply the Altman‘s Z-score model2 to 
indicate bankruptcy possibility.  However, the individual components of Altman‘s Z-
score do not have the same marginal effects on earnings management as those of the 
condensed Altman‘s Z-score. Hence, if we restrict ourselves to look at the relationship 
of earnings management and Altman‘s Z-score, these important differences are 
obscure. This paper, therefore, also takes this inappropriateness into consideration and 
statistically shows that these marginal effects are indeed different as well as quantifies 
how these individual effects differ.  
 This thesis provides insight analysis on the study of bankruptcy risk and 
earnings management. Accordingly, the results will be of interest to financial 
statement users—shareholders, investors, lenders, auditors, financial analysts—who 
need to consider the reliability of financial statements. In addition, by using modern 
time‘s data and the context regarding the relationship of bankruptcy risk and earnings 
management, the paper investigates whether the ―Altman‘s Z-score model‖, which is 
a widely-used model for bankruptcy risk evaluation, is still reasonable. As a result, 
this research will benefit both financial statement users and academic researchers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Literature review related to this 
empirical study is presented in chapter 2. Chapter 3 illustrates data and methodology 
for this empirical study. Chapter 4 presents empirical results which include multiple 
regression results and results of multiple linear restrictions testing. Chapter 5 
concludes key findings and provides suggestions for further study. 
                                                          
2
 The Altman‘s Z-score model has been extensively used to evaluate the overall firm‘s bankruptcy 
probability. Higher values of the score represent lower level of bankruptcy risk.  (Apergis, Sorros, 
Artikis, & Zisis (2011)). 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter discusses literature review regarding the issue of bankruptcy risk 
and earnings management. Firstly, I will begin with the discussion on conceptual 
framework related to this issue. As the issue on bankruptcy risk and earnings 
management, in particular, can be viewed as an agency problem, literature review 
related to agency theory will be provided at the beginning of the chapter. After that, I 
will further discuss what earnings management is and how to measure earnings 
management. Next, I will discuss about a particular variable of interest which is 
bankruptcy risk as well as data used to measure the risk. Other related literature, 
including literature related to bankruptcy risk and earnings management, other factors 
affecting the relationship between bankruptcy risk and earnings management, as well 
as the Altman‘s Z-score model will be illustrated towards the end of this chapter.  
 
2.1 The Conceptual Framework   
 
2.1.1 Agency theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that an agency relationship involves two 
parties—the principal(s) and the agent. The principal appoints the agent to deliver 
managerial services, and the agent receives some authority for decision making. 
Nonetheless, the agent may not best perform for benefits of the principal(s). Therefore, 
the principal can mitigate the risk of having agency problems by initiating some 
incentives to motivate the agent and by paying some costs  to control or investigate 
any harmful actions that may arise.  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) illustrates that agency problems can occur from two situations. That 
is, when the principal and the agent have different goals as well as when the principal 
cannot assess whether the agent behaves properly or not. Agency problem is a goal 
conflict which occurs when individuals with different preferences cooperate with each 
other. The theory assumes that individuals seek to work for their own interest and 
goal conflict arises at the organizational level. Additionally, individuals are rational 
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and asymmetric information normally occurs in the organization. As a result, two 
agency problems arise.   
 Moral hazard is defined as the situation when the agent may not put as much 
effort as agreed. 
 Adverse selection is defined as the situation when the principal cannot judge 
whether or not the agent is qualified for the job even when the agent is on duty 
or when he/she is being hired.  
In order to mitigate the problems, the principal can incur two types of agency cost to 
tie the employees‘ interests with shareholders‘ interests.  
 Behavior-oriented costs refer to costs incurred to control behaviors or actions 
of the agent, for instance, the principal can establish information system. A 
relevant example is to establish board of directors to monitor executives‘ 
behaviors. 
 Outcome-oriented costs refer to costs incurred to control results of an action of 
the agent, to name a few, commission to motivate the agent to increase sales 
figure, golden parachutes, and executive stock holdings.  
These problems could be mitigated by using external mechanism, such as ‗merger or 
acquisition‘. That is, if investors perceive that the firm is not performing well because 
of the poor management, investors may take over the company and fire the 
management. Having internal behavioral controls such as using appropriate 
information systems (e.g. budgeting, board of directors) could also help decrease the 
agent‘s opportunism and thus allows the principal to monitor the agent to best act for 
the interest of shareholders. Richardson (1998) finds that information asymmetry is 
positively related to income-increasing accruals. This suggests that information 
asymmetry provides opportunity for the management to manipulate earnings. With 
information asymmetry, stakeholders may not see through earnings manipulation as 
they lack relevant sources of information to effectively monitor the management‘s 
actions. 
 
Srichanpetch (2008) explains that agency theory views the owner of a company 
cannot operate the entity by himself and thus it is necessary to hire someone to 
manage the company. Hence, the principal (i.e. the owner/shareholder) and agent (i.e. 
the management) relationship incurs. The agent should not aim for the benefits for 
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self-interests but to do their best for the benefits of shareholders e.g. to maximize the 
value of the company to increase shareholders‘ wealth. Nonetheless, a lot of problems 
could arise during operations. For instance, the executive management might not have 
sufficient ability to manage the company or the management may take an opportunity 
to obtain the company‘s benefits for their self-interests. Consequently, agency 
problems occur.  
 
To sum up, earnings management can be considered as an agency problem. Agency 
theory provides framework for more understanding about why earnings management 
occurs. According to the aforementioned literature, it can be concluded that the 
management has some economic incentives to manipulate financial figures. When the 
company is experiencing unsatisfactory financial performance, the management may 
choose to conduct earnings management to modify actual financial results of the 
company to either cover their true abilities or to utilize the opportunism for their own 
interests (e.g. maintaining job security).  
 
2.1.2 Earnings management  
 
Referring to Schipper (1989)‘s definition, earnings management is ―the sense 
of a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent 
of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say, merely facilitating the neutral 
operation of the process).‖… ―A minor extension to the definition would encompass 
―real‖ earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or financing 
decisions to alter reported earnings or some subset of it.‖3 
 
According to SEC Chairman Levitt (1998), ―earnings management is a gray area 
where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, 
where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying 
financial performance of the company.‖4 
  
Healy and Wahlen (1999) say that ―earnings management occurs when the 
management‘s judgment in financial reporting  and in structuring transactions to alter 
                                                          
3
 See more detailed definition in Schipper (1989)‘s paper. 
4
 See more detailed definition in Levitt (1998)‘s paper. 
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financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers‖ 5 .  Consistent with a lot of earnings management 
literature, the authors conclude managers can take advantages of earnings 
management mainly for the following purposes: 
 To influence stock market perceptions by adjusting financial reports before 
public offerings e.g. initial public offerings or secondary offerings. 
 To maintain job security or enhance compensation. 
 To mitigate the risks of breaching loan agreements.  
 To avoid interventions from the regulatory authorities. 
 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) explain that accounting choices made within the 
boundaries of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) could be viewed as 
earnings management if they are used to lure actual financial results of the company. 
Earnings management and financial fraud are actually not the same. Earnings 
management refers to those accounting choices within the boundaries of GAAP, such 
as overstating provisions and postponing revenues. However, accounting fraud refers 
to those accounting practices that contradict with GAAP rules, for instance, creating 
fake sales invoices to inflate revenues. 
 
Nonetheless, Magrath and Weld (2002) state that it is necessary to correctly define 
―earnings management‖ since the SEC and accounting profession admit the truth that 
some earnings manipulation methods are not considered as frauds.  
 
Weil (2009) provides explanation that earnings management is not a technical term in 
accounting or finance. However, it occurs when there is opportunism for the 
management to exercise discretion to alter reported financial earnings.  
 
Rahman, Moniruzzaman, and Sharif (2013) define earnings management as 
management decisions to report stable and predictable financial figures
6
.  The 
management exercises judgment to manipulate the firm‘s earnings so that the 
financial results meet the forecast figures. Earnings management is considered as the 
                                                          
5
 See more detailed definition in Healy and Wahlen (1999)‘s paper. 
6
 See more detailed definition in Rahman, Moniruzzaman, and Sharif (2013)‘s paper. 
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management‘s effort to use specific accounting methods to manipulate earnings 
within the boundaries of accounting standards. Although earnings management is said 
to be unethical, it is not always illegal. More importantly, it is a method that the 
management uses to maximize the value of the firm while reducing risk. The authors 
also emphasizes that there are many motivations behind the use of earnings 
management. Some of the most important ones are: 
1) Stock market motivation 
2) Signaling or concealing private information motivation 
3) Personal incentives motivation 
4) Firm‘s internal motivation (e.g. budget goals) 
5) Management compensation contract motivation  
6) Lending contract motivation 
7) Regulatory motivation   
 
Omar et al. (2014) explain that earnings management is a well-known method 
managers use to manipulate accounting numbers. However, this does not mean these 
activities are illegal. Since managers have flexibility to choose accounting or 
operating methods, there is room for them to manage earnings. There are several 
techniques used for earnings management. See Omar et al. (2014)‘s paper for an 
extended discussion of the twelve most popular earnings management techniques. 
 
In summary, earnings management implies an act of altering financial results which 
do not reflect true performance of the company. Several accounting techniques can be 
used to achieve such purpose.  As accounting choices are provided for the 
management to choose, the management can take advantage of this opportunism by 
exercising discretion on accounting methods to conduct earnings manipulation. As a 
result, financial statements can be falsified and thus mislead financial statement users 
when making economic decisions. Since there is still no clear concurrence on how to 
define earnings management, one should exercise judgment when interpreting results 
of researches regarding earnings manipulation detection (Beneish, 2001).  
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Earnings management determinants 
 
There are various ways to detect earnings management. Some scholars study 
earnings management by using accruals, changes in disclosures, or real activities 
manipulation
10
 (Siddharth, 2011). Nevertheless, the majority of them prefer using 
discretionary accruals as a measurement of accounting choice to test earnings 
management hypothesis. From management‘s point of view, accruals are favorable 
for manipulating accounting numbers owing to their low costs
11
. As accrual-based 
measurements combine the net effect of various accounting policies into one number, 
they can better analyze income manipulation (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Young, 
1999).  Several studies consider that discretionary accrual is a good measurement for 
earnings management determination. Hence, they apply discretionary accruals to 
investigate income manipulation. Some of the researches that apply discretionary 
accruals as an earnings management determinant are, for instance, Ayes, Jiang, and 
Yeung (2006), Chtourou, Bédard, and Courteau (2001), as well as Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2005). For this reason, this paper applies discretionary accruals as a 
measurement for earnings manipulation.  
According to Healy (1985), accruals are defined as the difference between 
cash flow from operations and net income. Total accruals consist of two parts which 
are nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Nondiscretionary accruals 
refer to accruals imposed by accounting regulatory authorities, such as the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
Basically, nondiscretionary accruals are accruals or adjustments to cash flows that 
comply with accounting standard rules, for example, fixed assets must be depreciated 
in some systematic manner.  This type of accruals occurs from normal operations and 
is not caused by the management‘s discretion to manipulate earnings. In contrast, 
discretionary accruals refer to cash flows‘ adjustments that the management exercises 
discretion to alter financial figures. Since the management is given opportunities to 
select accounting methods specified in the accounting standards, the management can 
take advantage of this opportunism to manage earnings. For instance, the manager can 
choose to expedite or defer delivery of inventory at year end, or he can alter the 
method to depreciate fixed assets from year to year to alter reported financial results. 
                                                          
10
 See further explanation of real activities manipulation in Roychowdhury (2006)‘s paper.  
11
 See further explanation in Young (1999)‘s paper. 
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In a nutshell, accruals can be used to delay or accelerate timing of reported 
earnings. This implies that ―discretionary accruals‖ allow managers to modify 
earnings from period to period. Therefore, once discretionary accruals are measured, 
financial statement users can infer from the results whether the management engages 
in earnings manipulation or not.  
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) explain that discretionary accruals are 
commonly considered as a measurement to analyze earnings manipulation. To do so, 
it is recommended that a model to measure discretionary portion of the accounting 
earnings should be used.  Scholars have developed many models, ranging from basic 
models which assume discretionary accruals and total accruals portions are the same 
to more complicated ones in which total accruals are separated into nondiscretionary 
and discretionary portions. The authors choose five accruals-based models to evaluate 
the measurement effectiveness for detecting earnings management. The authors come 
to the conclusion that, among all the five alternative methods, the ―modified Jones 
model‖ is the most effective model to capture management‘s earnings manipulation. 
Therefore, this paper also uses the modified Jones model to derive discretionary 
accruals. The modified Jones model is as follows
12
. 
 
The Modified Jones Model (Developed by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995)) 
        ̂ 
 
          
   ̂ 
             
          
  ̂  
     
          
 
where 
        = Nondiscretionary accruals for firm i in year t 
            = Total assets for firm i in year t-1 
        = Revenues for firm i in year t less revenues for firm i in  
year t-1 
        = Net receivables for firm i in year t less net receivables  
for firm i in year t-1 
        = Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t 
          = Firm-specific parameters 
 
                                                          
12
 For the other models, see more details in Dechow et al. (1995)‘s paper. 
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